Anti-Corruption Policies: Eligibility and Debarment Practices at the World Bank and Regional Development Banks by Deming, Stuart H.
Anti-Corruption Policies: Eligibility and
Debarment Practices at the World Bank and
Regional Development Banks
S-rUART H. DEMING*
In the 1990s, the World Bank and the regional development banks, including the Afri-
can Development Bank (AFDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the Inter-American Development
Bank (IADB), began to seriously address the issue of corruption and its relationship to
development in their procurement practices.' Taking advantage of their virtually un-
matched leverage with borrower governments and multinational corporations, these mul-
tilateral lending institutions now use their procurement practices as a means of deterring
corruption. The policies adopted and enforced by each institution seek to eliminate op-
portunities for corruption associated with their operations and to tie their lending to pro-
gress in combating corruption.
I. The World Bank
Policies instituted by the World Bank provide a multifaceted approach to using, in a
meaningful way, the Bank's procurement practices as a means of deterring fraud relating
* Stuart H. Deming is a principal with Deming PLLC in Washington, D.C. and in Michigan where he
represents clients in a range of foreign business and investigatory matters. He previously served with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission and in various capacities with the U.S. Department of Justice. This
article is adapted from a chapter of Mr. Deming's best-selling book: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the
New International Norms (ABA Publishing, 2d ed. 2010). For many years, he co-chaired the ABA's National
Institutes on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. He founded the ABA's Task Force on International
Standards for Corrupt Practices, and he is a member of the Board of Editorial Advisors to the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Reporter. Mr. Deming received his B.A., M.B.A., and J.D. from the University of Michigan. He
has also been licensed as a Certified Public Accountant in the State of Michigan.
1. What is commonly referred to as the "World Bank" is officially known as the World Bank Group. The
World Bank Group is composed of five closely-associated institutions: the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International Fi-
nance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). While separate procedures may be associated with
each of these institutions, each follows the same basic pattern. As a result, reference is made to the World
Bank, as opposed to each institution, when discussing the anti-corruption procedures associated with these
institutions.
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to the projects supported or funded by the World Bank. More than mere platitudes are
involved. Well-defined enforcement mechanisms are in place and being actively em-
ployed to address allegations of fraud, corruption, and other improprieties.
Severe sanctions requiring debarment or "blacklisting" by the World Bank have been
imposed in a multitude of cases. 2 In addition to being subject to sanctions imposed by
other institutions, the public nature of the sanctions imposed by the World Bank holds the
prospect of exposing an individual or entity to scrutiny in the country where the sanc-
tioned conduct occurred as well as being accessible to an organization that may contem-
plate engaging the individual or entity or financing a project with which they may be
involved.
An individual or entity can be found ineligible or debarred, either indefinitely or for a
stated period of time, when it is determined that the individual or entity engaged in cor-
rupt or fraudulent practices in competing for, or in executing, a contract financed by the
World Bank. Debarment by the World Bank may also result in ineligibility for procure-
ments at other multilateral lending institutions, as well as before government agencies in a
growing number of countries.3
Issues relating to fraud and corruption are now critical to the procurement process. A
proposal will be rejected if it is determined that the bidder or consultant considered for
the award of a contract engaged in corrupt or fraudulent practices in competing for the
contract. 4 The portion of a loan allocated to a contract for goods, works, or services can
be cancelled if a determination is made that representatives of the borrower or executing
agency engaged in corrupt or fraudulent practices during the procurement or selection
process.5
2. An updated listing of individuals and entities debarred by the World Bank can be found on the World
Bank's website. The World Bank Group [World Bank], World Banking Ineligible Firms, http://
www.worldbank.org/debarr (last visited Apr. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Ineligible Firms].
3. The sanctions procedures also contemplate disclosure to governments and other organizations. See,
e.g., World Bank, IBRD/IDA Sanctions Procedures, § 22 (Jan. 1, 2009), reprinted in STUART H. DEMING, THE
FoREIGN CORRUPr PRAcicES Acr AND THE NFsv INTFRNATIONAL NoRMXs App. II-G, pt. 4, at 599 (ABA
Publishing, 2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter Sanctions Procedures]. It should be added that the sanctions procedures
associates with the different components at the World Bank Group are fundamentally the same. See, e.g.,
IFC, IFC Sanctions Procedures, § 18 (2007), available at http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/anticorruption.nsf/
AttachmentsByTitle/Sanctions.Procedures/$FILE/Sanctions Procedures.pdf; MIGA, MIGA Sanctions Proce-
dures, § 18 (Nov. 2, 2006), available at http://www.miga.org/documents/MIGA-Sanctions-Proceduresl.pdf.
As just one example of the collateral consequences of debarment by the World Bank, the Millennium
Challenge Corporation, a development organization funded by the U.S. government, excludes individuals or
entities debarred by the World Bank from its procurements. Millennium Challenge Corporation, Millennium
Cballenge Corporation Program Procurement Guidance: Guidance on Ercluded Parties Verification Procedures in
MCA Entity Program Procurements Program, 1 (Feb. 15, 2008), available at http://www.incc.gov/documents/
mcc-ppg-eligibilityverification.pdf.
4. World Bank, World Bank Procurement Guidelines, § 1.14, 1 (b) (Oct. 2006), available at http://web.world
bank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAJPROJECTS/PROCUREMENT/0,,contentMDY,20060840-menuPK93
977-pagePK:84269-piPK60001558-theSitePK84266-isCURL:Y,00.htin [hereinafter Procurement Guide-
lines]; World Bank, World Bank Consultant Guidelines, § 1.22, (b) (2006), available at http://web.worldbank.
org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/PROCUREMENT/0,,contentMDK.20060656-menuPK.93977-
pagePK84269-piPK60001558-theSitePK.84266,00.html [hereinafter Consultant Guidelines].
5. Procurement Guidelines, supra note 4, § 1.14, 1 (c); Consultant Guidelines, supra note 4, § 1.22, 1(c).
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Similar steps are possible in cases of fraud or corruption in the actual execution of a
contract or project awarded or financed by the World Bank.6 The World Bank can ap-
point auditors to inspect the accounts and records of suppliers, contractors, or consultants
related to the performance of a contract.7 Procedures for reporting allegations anony-
mously and protecting whistleblowers have also been implemented.8
A. AN-n-CoumerON POLICrES AND GUIDELINES
The World Bank's procurement rules and the rules for the selection of consultants in-
clude language specifically addressing fraud and corruption.9 A vendor must be found to
be responsible in order to be eligible to bid on a World Bank contract.'0 An individual or
entity's integrity is among the critical factors in determining responsibility.I Debarment
by the World Bank, a World Bank member government, or an international organization
can be the basis for a finding of non-responsibility.12 The commission of an "act or of-
fense indicating a lack of integrity or honesty" or the serious violation of a World Bank
contract may also serve a basis for a finding of non-responsibility. 3
A vendor may be suspended pending a determination of responsibility.14 A non-respon-
sibility determination applies to "all affiliates of the vendor."' 5 A finding of non-responsi-
bility must be based on evidence "that it is more likely than not that the vendor is not a
responsible vendor."' 6 A preponderance of evidence is required to support the "finding
that the vendor is not a responsible vendor." 7 The period or extent of ineligibility may
be reduced or eliminated with "newly discovered material information,"8 a "bona fide
change in ownership or management,"19 "measures taken by the vendor to become re-
sponsible," 20 or other reasons deemed to be appropriate. 21
6. Procurement Guidelines, supra note 4, § 1.14; Consultant Guidelines, supra note 4, § 1.22.
7. Procurement Guidelines, supra note 4, § 1.14, 1 (e); Consultant Guidelines, supra note 4, § 1.22, 1 (e).
8. Information relative to the World Bank's hotline and reporting allegations concerning questionable
conduct can be found on the World Bank's website. World Bank, Report Suspected Fraud or Corruption,
http://go.worldbank.org/OBUOB60810 (last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
9. Procurement Guidelines, supra note 4, § 1.14, 9 (b); Consultant Guidelines, supra note 4, § 1.22, (b).
10. World Bank, World Bank Vendor Eligibility Policy, 1.2, http://go.worldbank.org/W40WJB5AAO
(last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
11. Id. 1 3.1.
12. Id. I$ 3.1(g) and 3.2.
13. Id. %T 3.1(f) and (i). Refusal to cooperate with a World Bank audit or investigation can also be a basis
for a finding of non-responsibility. Id. T 3.10).
14. Id. 9 4.1.
15. Id. T 5.4.
16. Id. 1 5.5.
17. Id.
18. Id. 9 6.2(b)(i).
19. Id. 9 6.2(b)(iii).
20. Id. I 6.2(b)(iv).
21. Id. T 6.2(b)(v). One commentator raised concerns that the process for rejecting a vendor is not as well
developed as that relating to a debarment. Sope Williams, The Debarnent of Cormpt Contractors from World
Bank-Financed Contracts, 36 Pun. Co'-r. L. J. 277, 289-94 (2007).
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Legal agreements for each project incorporate by reference the World Bank's Anti-
Corruption Guidelines.22 Project participants are to be furnished the Anti-Corruption
Guidelines. 23 The Anti-Corruption Guidelines outline the obligations of borrowers and
recipients "to prevent and combat fraud and corruption" in projects financed by the
World Bank. 24 Borrowers and recipients are required to take "all appropriate measures to
prevent and combat fraud and corruption." 25 "[T]imely and appropriate action" is re-
quired when cases of fraud and corruption arise. 26
The Anti-Corruption Guidelines are broad in scope. They extend to fraud and corrup-
tion committed, or attempted, by recipients of loan proceeds in connection with the use of
World Bank loan proceeds. 27 The phrase "recipients of loan proceeds" applies to individ-
uals or entities receiving loan proceeds for their own use, serving as fiscal agents for the
deposit or transfer of loan proceeds, or making or influencing decisions regarding the use
of loan proceeds. 28 The "use of loan proceeds" includes diverting loan proceeds for ineli-
gible expenditures or influencing, through fraud or corruption, a decision as to the use of
loan proceeds. 29
B. INVESTIGATION OF QUESTIONABLE CONDUCT
The Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) at the World Bank investigates allegations that an
individual or entity is engaged in questionable conduct in conjunction with a World Bank-
financed project. The INT's jurisdiction is not limited to the procurement process.30 It
extends to fraud and corruption in the use of World Bank loan proceeds in conjunction
with World Bank-financed investment projects as well. 3' The jurisdiction also extends to
"non-compliance with the [World] Bank's third-party audit rights and deliberate obstruc-
tion of [World] Bank investigations into fraud and corruption." 32
1. Nature of Conduct Subject to Investigation
Sanctionable Misconduct investigated by the INT includes fraud, corruption, coercion,
collusion, and obstructive conduct. 33 The conduct need not be completed or succeed in
22. World Bank, The World Bank's Anti-Corruption Guidelines and Sanctions Reform: A User's Guide,
at 1 (Oct. 15, 2006), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-11737953
4022 1/EnglishFinalAntiCorruptionGuidelines505_O8nd.pdf [hereinafter Anti-Corruption Guidelines].
23. Id. attachment I 9(a)(ii).
24. Id. attachment 1 1.
25. Id. attachment ] 2.
26. Id. attachment I 9(c). Even before the onset of an investigation, this includes immediately reporting
"any allegations of fraud and corruption that come to its attention." Id. attachment 11 9(b), 10(b).
27. Id. attachment IT 7-10.
28. Id. attachment 5. It does not matter whether the fiscal agent is a beneficiary of the loan proceeds. Id.
29. Id. attachment 1 4.
30. E.g., Sanctions Procedures, rupra note 3, at pt. I, ' (c); Anti-Corruption Guidelines, supra note 22, attach-
ment 1 4-5, 9-10.
31. Sanctions Procedures, supra note 3, at pt. 1, 1 (c); Anti-Comption Guidelines, supra note 22, attachment 91
4-5, 9-10.
32. Anti-Corruption Guidelines, supra note 22, at 4; see also Sanctions Procedures, supra note 3, at 3.
33. Anti-Corruption Guidelines, supra note 22, at 6-9.
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order to be sanctionable. 34 Each form of misconduct has a unique definition under the
World Bank's guidelines.
a. Corrupt Practice
A "corrupt practice is the offering, giving, receiving or soliciting, directly or indirectly,
of anything of value to influence improperly the actions of another party."s3 It does not
matter whether the offer was accepted or received or whether "the purpose of the pay-
ment was achieved."3 6 As the definition implies, both active and passive bribery are pro-
hibited. "[T]he definition of corrupt practice is not limited to the prohibited activity
during the procurement process but extends to bribery during the execution of the con-
tract."3 7 Bribery may also be employed to prompt lax enforcement of contract clauses or
requirements relative to a multitude of issues such as a delay, the quality of a product, or
the use of subcontractors. 38
Classic examples of corrupt practices may include bribing officials to be chosen or
placed on the "short list" or to obtain confidential information relating to the factors that
will be critical to the selection process.3 9 This can include situations where an individual
or entity is awarded a government contract financed by the World Bank and a kickback of
some sort is offered or directed toward the government official who steered the contract
to the individual or entity.40
b. Fraudulent Practice
A "fraudulent practice is any act or omission, including a misrepresentation, that know-
ingly or recklessly misleads, or attempts to mislead, a party to obtain a financial or other
benefit or to avoid an obligation."4 ' In general, any material misrepresentation or omis-
sion of material information constitutes a fraudulent practice. A negligent or innocent
misrepresentation or omission does not constitute a violation.42 The action must be taken
34. E.g., id. at 9.
35. E.g., id. at 5.
36. E.g., id. at 9.
37. Williams, supra note 21, at 287.
38. Id. (citing MARIO A. AGUILAR FT A., PREVENTING FRAUD AND CORRUPTION IN WORLD BANK
PROJECTS: A GUIDE FOR STAFF 9 (2000)).
39. This included situations where improper benefits were made to World Bank staff and where a company
participated in a joint venture with World Bank staff while also conducting business with the World Bank.
Anti-Cormption Guidelines, supra note 22, attachment [ 7(a). Companies have been debarred for engaging in
corrupt activities with World Bank officials. Press Release, World Bank, Statement: World Bank Group
Discloses Debarments under Corporate Procurement Program, No.2009/198/EXC (Jan. 11, 2009), available
at http://web.worldbank.org/VBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contenttMDK-22030864-pagePK:642570
43-piPK:437376-theSitePK:4607,00.html.
40. Anti-Comption Guidelines, sutpra note 22, at 6.
41. Id.; see also Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Debars Four for Engaging in Fraud in Bank-
Financed Projects, No. 2009/375/INT (June 2, 2009), available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EX-
TERNAL/INEWS/0,,contentMDK:22198025-pagePK-64257043-piPK:437376-theSitePK:4607,00.html?
cid=3001,= (submission of a false bank reference letter to secure a contract for a project in Azerbaijan was the
basis of a debarment of an entity and its principal).
42. "To act, 'knowingly or recklessly,' the fraudulent actor must either know that the information or im-
pression being conveyed is false, or be recklessly indifferent as to whether it is true or false. Mere inaccuracy
in such information or impression, committed through simple negligence, is not enough to constitute a fraud-
ulent practice." Anti-Cormption Guidelines, supra note 22, at 5, note 10.
SUMMER 2010
876 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
knowingly or in a manner "recklessly indifferent as to whether [the information] is true or
false."43
One example of a fraudulent practice would be a situation where the credentials or
expertise of a consultant were misrepresented in order to meet the criteria to be selected
as part of a procurement associated with the World Bank.44 This could include misrepre-
senting experience or facts in proposals or falsifying or forging documents in support of
proposals. 45 Other examples include "financial misrepresentations, the falsification of
contract implementation information and accounting records, the tender of misleading
bids, malicious frontloading of contract prices, overbilling, and the alteration of invoices
or other supporting documents."4 6 It also extends to "any document-based change de-
signed to manipulate or alter procurement or contractual outcomes." 4 7 Withholding in-
formation about material conflicts of interest could also fall within this category.
c. Collusive Practice
A "collusive practice is an arrangement between two or more parties designed to
achieve an improper purpose, including influencing improperly the actions of another
party."48 A typical example of a collusive practice is where an individual or entity works
with other individuals or entities to manipulate the system to achieve an improper result.4 9
A collusive practice also includes situations where an individual or entity works with
others to steer a contract award to a particular individual or entity.o
Stifling competition can be a collusive practice. Manipulating the requirements for a
request for proposal so as to exclude others would be an example of collusion, as would
situations where parties work in tandem to actively and maliciously impede others from
having an opportunity to bid on a potential contract.5 A collusive practice can be an
arrangement among possible suppliers wherein they agree, before bids are submitted, on a
price over and beyond what is crpmpetitive and decide who among their number will sub-
43. Id.
44. Id. at 6-7.
45. See Press Release, World Bank, Croatia: World Bank Sanctions BIS Healthcare Group in a Health
Reform Project (Nov. 22, 2004), available at http://go.worldbank.org/HKCFUV3NAl (debarment of com-
pany and its principal for misrepresenting their experience and qualifications); Press Release, World Bank,
World Bank Debars Firm, Individual For Fraudulent Practices Under Russian Federation Community Social
Infrastructure Project, No: 2006/343/ECA (Mar. 30, 2006), available at httpi/web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNALINEWS/0,,contentMDK-20870134-menuPK34463-pagePK34370-piPK:34424-theSitePK
4607,00.html (debarment for forging a manufacturer's letter of authorization and for misrepresenting infor-
mation in corporate documents).
46. Williams, supra note 21, at 287 (citing AcUILAR, supra note 38, at 9).
47. Id. at 287-88.
48. Anti-Corruption Guidelines, supra note 22, at 8.
49. Id.; see Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Debars Seven Firms and One Individual for Collusive
Practices Under Philippines Roads Project, No: 2009/200/INT fan. 14, 2009), available at http://
go.worldbank.org/BKL6BASPQO (last visited April 20, 2010) [hereinafter Press Release 2009/200/INT
(firms sanctioned after it was determined that they "had participated in a collusive scheme designed to estab-
lish bid prices at artificial, non-competitive levels and to deprive the [World Bank] Borrower of the benefits of
free and open competition").
50. Anti-Corruption Guidelines, supra note 22, at 8.
5 1. Id.
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mit the winning bid, still artificially high, while the other suppliers submit extremely high
bids (that have no chance of winning). 52
In such a situation, the proceeds may be shared among the suppliers or possibly through
a rotation system to facilitate the bids of other suppliers.s3
d. Coercive Practice
A "coercive practice is impairing or harming, or threatening to impair or harm, directly
or indirectly, any party or the property of the party to influence improperly the actions of
a party."54 An example of a coercive practice is taking steps that may prevent a competing
bidder from submitting a timely bid.ss Another example is exerting undue pressure on
decision makers. 56
e. Obstructive Practice
An "obstructive practice" is
(i) deliberately destroying, falsifying, altering or concealing of evidence material to
the investigation or making false statements to investigators in order to materially
impede a [World] Bank investigation into allegations of a corrupt, fraudulent, coer-
cive or collusive practice; and/or threatening, harassing or intimidating any party to
prevent it from disclosing its knowledge of matters relevant to the investigation or
from pursuing the investigation, or any combination of the foregoing, or (ii) acts
intended to materially impede the exercise of the [World] Bank's contractual rights of
audit or access to information.57
One example is a situation where a company that has been awarded a World Bank-
financed contract fails to respond to a request by the World Bank to review its records.58
2. Investigatory Process
If the INT finds evidence of Sanctionable Misconduct, it presents the case to a Sanc-
tions Evaluation and Suspension Officer (EO)-the first step in the adjudicatory process.59
The EO evaluates "whether there is sufficient evidence to support a finding" that some-
one has engaged in a sanctionable practice. 60 If the EO determines that proceeding with
the adjudicatory process is not appropriate, the EO notifies the INT and does not issue
52. Williams, supra note 21, at 288 (citing ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION c1. 6
(1988)).
53. Id.; see Press Release, World Bank, Timor-Leste: World Bank Sanctions Companies in School Project
(Nov. 22, 2004), available at http://go.worldbank.org/QEQ0NTN300 (companies debarred for colluding to
divide different lots of furniture by deciding which company would have the lowest bid).
54. Anti-Corruption Guidelines, supra note 22, at 7.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 7-8.
57. Id. at 7, 9. One example is a situation where a company that has been awarded a World Bank-financed
contract fails to respond to a request by the World Bank to review its records. Id. attachment 1 7(e).
58. Id. at 9.
59. Generally, as long as substantive issues are not addressed, the EO may be approachable relative to
providing clarification or answering questions concerning procedural aspects of the process. Sanctions Proce-
dures, supra note 3, § 1(1).
60. Id. § 9(1).
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the notice. 61 The INT may resubmit a proposed notice to the EO after making appropri-
ate amendments. 62 If the alleged sanctionable practice took place more than ten years
prior to the issuance of the notice by the EO, the matter must be closed.63
If the EO determines that sufficient evidence exists, the EO issues a "Notice of Sanc-
tions Proceedings."64 The Notice specifies the allegations, 65 summarizes the facts consti-
tuting the sanctionable practice, 66 identifies the evidence that the INT intends to present
along with any exculpatory evidence,67 and includes a recommended sanction.68 If a No-
tice is issued, a temporary suspension automatically goes into effect with all of the compo-
nents of the World Bank Group, unless the EO determines sixty days after the submission
of an explanation that a suspension should not take effect.6 9
If, after the submission of an explanation, the EO determines that there is insufficient
evidence to support a finding that a sanctionable practice took place, the EO may with-
draw the Notice and the proceedings may be closed. 70 The INT retains the right to
resubmit an amended proposed Notice on the basis of additional information not con-
tained in the original notice.7' If a Notice of Sanctions Proceedings is issued and the
respondent, the individual or entity subject to the recommended sanctions, does not con-
test the allegations, the recommended sanctions become final. 72
3. Hearings Process
If the respondent contests the allegations made by the INT or the recommended sanc-
tions, or both, the case is referred to the World Bank's Sanctions Board-the second step in
the adjudicatory process.73 The Board, comprised of three members of World Bank staff
and four external members, considers the evidence against the respondent, along with any
response from the respondent, before making a final decision.74 The Sanctions Board
61. Id. § 9(2).
62. Id.
63. Id. § 9(1)(b).
64. Id. § 9(3).
65. Id. § 7(1).
66. Id. § 7(2).
67. Id. § 7(3).
68. Id. § 7(4).
69. Id. § 9(6).
70. Id. § 9(9).
71. Id.; see Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Sanctions Lahmeyer International for Corrupt Activi-
ties in Bank-Financed Projects, No. 129/2007/tNT (Nov. 6, 2006), available at http://go.worldbank.org/
7DBYL7MONO [hereinafter Press Release 129/2007/INTJ (the actual convictions of both Lahmeyer Inter-
national GmbH and the recipient of the bribe were not contained in the original notice in the debarment
proceedings against Lahmeyer International for its activities in connection with a water project in Lesotho).
72. Sanctions Procedures, supra note 3, § 9(9); see Press Release 2009/200/INT, supra note 49 (sanctions
recommended by the EO in the notice imposed upon the failure of Dongsung Construction Co. Ltd. to
contest the allegations).
73. See Sanctions Procedures, supra note 3, at pt. I, I[ (b).
74. Int'l Bank for Reconstruction & Dev. & Int'l Dev. Ass'n Int'l Fin. Corp. and Multilateral Ins. Guaran-
tee Agency, Sanctions Board Statute, art. V (Dec. 2006), available at http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/anticorrup-
tion.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/Sanctions.Statute/SFILE/SanctionsStatute.pdf.
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Chair in a particular case may designate a smaller, three-person Sanctions Board Panel,
composed of two external members and one World Bank staff member. 75
Written submissions to the EO and Sanctions Board are permitted as part of the sanc-
tions process.76 Sensitive evidence may be withheld where the Sanctions Board or Sanc-
tions Board Panel determines that "there is a reasonable basis to conclude that revealing
the particular evidence might endanger the life, health, safety, or well-being of a person"
or constitute a violation of the terms of the Voluntary Disclosure Program.77
The INT or the respondent may request a hearing.78 The INT is represented by a
person from its office.79 The respondent may be "self-represented" or represented by
someone authorized by the party.so The hearing and submissions of the parties are confi-
dential and not available or open to the public.8' The presentations are informal and
limited to arguments and evidence in written submissions.82 No live witness testimony is
permitted unless requested by the Sanctions Board or Sanctions Board Panel.83 Only the
Sanctions Board or Sanctions Board Panel may question the witness. 84
Formal rules of evidence do not apply in these proceedings.ss "Any form of evidence
may form the basis of arguments presented."86 In addition, "[h]earsay evidence or docu-
mentary evidence shall be given the weight deemed appropriate." 87 Purpose, intent, and
knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.88 "A party's refusal to answer,
or failure to answer truthfully or credibly, may be construed against [the] party."89 Com-
munications subject to the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine
are protected and not subject to disclosure. 90
The decision of the Sanctions Board or Sanctions Board Panel is based upon the written
submissions and any arguments made at a hearing.91 The standard of proof is whether the
evidence "supports the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the Respondent
engaged in a Sanctionable Practice." 92 "More likely than not" means that "a preponder-
ance of the evidence supports a finding that the respondent engaged in the Sanctionable
Practice."93
75. Id. art. VIII.
76. Sanctions Procedures, supra note 3, § 10.
77. Id. § 12(3).
78. Id. § 14.
79. Id. § 15(1).
80. Id. § 15(2).
81. Id. § 16(1).
82. Id. § 16(2)(c).
83. Id. § 16(2)(d).
84. Id.




89. Id. § 16(3).
90. Id. § 18.
91. Id. §§ 13, 19(1).
92. Id. § 19(2)(a).
93. Id.
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The INT has the burden of proof to establish that "it is more likely than not that the
respondent engaged in the Sanctionable Practice."94 If the INT successfully establishes
the Sanctionable Practice, the burden of proof shifts to the respondent "to demonstrate
that it is more likely than not" that the conduct did not amount to a Sanctionable Prac-
tice.95 If the respondent establishes that the conduct did not amount to a Sanctionable
Practice, the proceedings are terminated. 96 The INT may reinstitute the process "if evi-
dence not available at the time of filing of the [original] notice is subsequently obtained."97
4. Sanctions
The sanctions imposed by the Sanctions Board or Sanctions Board Panel are not bound
by the recommendation of the EO.98 The sanctions imposed may fall into five basic
categories:
1. Public Letter of Reprimand, which is issued to the sanctioned party.99
2. Debarment, "which means that the sanctioned party is barred, effective immediately,
from participating in [World] Bank projects, either indefinitely or for a period of
time."loo
3. Conditional Non-Debarment, which means that the sanctioned party is told that they
will be debarred unless they comply with certain conditions, i.e., doing certain
things to make sure that fraud and corruption does not happen again, such as put-
ting in place an ethics program, and/or making up for the damage caused by their
actions, such as restitution. 01
4. Debarment with Conditional Release, "which means that the sanctioned party is debar-
red until the specified conditions have been complied with." 02
5. Restitution, "which means paying back the ill-gotten gains to the government or to
the victim of the fraud and corruption." 0 3
The Sanctions Board or Sanctions Board Panel may impose one or more sanctions,
including cumulative sanctions.""' The sanctions may be imposed on any individual or
entity that, "directly or indirectly, controls or is controlled" by the party charged.os
Among the factors that may be considered in the imposition of sanctions are: the "egre-
giousness and severity" of the conduct; 06 the degree of active conduct on the part of the
party charged; 07 the magnitude of the losses or damages; 08 the past history of sanction-
94. Id. § 19(2)(b).
95. Id.
96. Id. § 19(2)(c).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 19(2)(d).
99. Anti-Corruption Guidelines, supra note 22, at 13.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 14; see Press Release 129/2007/INT, supra note 71 (Lahmeyer International's debarment to be
reduced by four years if Lahmeyer International "puts in place a satisfactory corporate compliance and ethics
program and cooperates fully ... in disclosing any past misconduct...
103. Anti-Corruption Guidelines, supra note 22, at 14.
104. Sanctions Procedures, supra note 3, §§ 19(3)(0, (g).
105. Id. § 19(4).
106. Id. § 19(5)(a).
107. Id. § 19(5)(b).
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able conduct;1o9 breach or attempted breach of refraining voluntarily from seeking or ob-
taining World Bank financing, contracts, or awards pending the outcome of sanctions
proceedings;"10 mitigating circumstances such as cooperation in investigation;" 1 and the
period of temporary suspension already served."l 2
5. Disclosures
The sanctioned party's identity and sanctions imposed are publicly disclosed."13 Infor-
mation obtained from the sanctions proceedings may be provided to governmental au-
thorities, international organizations, or other development banks. 114 Disclosure can
occur before determining the culpability of an individual or entity. No prior notice is
required, nor is there a means of precluding such disclosures. Limitations on disclosures
to governments or international organizations may be imposed if "there is a reasonable
basis that revealing the information might endanger the life, health, safety, or well-being
of a person" or violate an understanding associated with the Voluntary Disclosure Pro-
gram (VDP)."n5
C. VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE PROGRAM
The World Bank established the VDP as a means for an individual or entity to take
remedial action by addressing conduct that might: (1) otherwise pose an impediment to
securing opportunities through the World Bank; or (2) lead to the imposition of sanctions
for current projects with the World Bank. Except for those under active investigation by
the World Bank,116 individuals and entities may participate in the VDP if they have been a
party to, or involved in, projects or contracts financed or supported by a member of the
World Bank Group." 7
In exchange for their full cooperation, VDP participants avoid debarment for disclosed
past misconduct, their identities are kept confidential, and they may continue to compete
for Bank-supported projects."i 8 This agreement extends to the conduct of current or for-
mer officers, employees, or agents of the entity involved in the disclosed misconduct.119
108. Id. § 19(5)(c).
109. Id. § 19(5)(d).
110. Id. § 19(5)(e).
11l. Id. § 19(5)(f); see Press Release 129/2007/INT, supra note 71 (lack of cooperation with World Bank
investigating officials was acknowledged as a factor in the sanctions imposed in the debarment proceedings
against Lahmeyer International GmbH).
112. Sanctions Procedures, supra note 3, § 19(5)(h).
113. Id. § 21; see Ineligible Finns, supra note 2 (listing firms ineligible to do business with the World Bank
Group).
114. Sanctions Procedures, supra note 3, §§ 22(1)-(3).
115. Id. §§ 12(3), 18.
116. World Bank, Dept. of Institutional Integrity, Voluntary Disclosure Program, VDP Guidelines for Partici-
pants, 1 5.1(a) (July 20, 2006) available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IN.TVOLDISPRO/Resources/
VDPGuidelinesforParticipants.pdf [hereinafter VDP Guidelines].
117. Id. I 5.1.b (including the IBRD, the IDA, the IFC, and the MIGA).
118. Id. f1 3-4.
119. Id. 1 4 ("The Bank will not seek the Participant's debarments for its, or its current or former officers',
employees', or agents' involvement in disclosed Misconduct that occurred prior to the Participant joining the
VDP.").
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Participants enter the VDP by agreeing to a non-negotiable, standardized set of "Terms
and Conditions."I 20 The World Bank will debar, for a period of ten years, any participant
that continues to engage in misconduct or otherwise materially violates the VDP Terms
and Conditions.121
Under the VDP, participants commit to: (1) not engage in misconduct in the future; (2)
disclose to the World Bank the results of an internal investigation into conduct subject to
sanction by the World Bank involving projects or contracts financed or supported by the
World Bank; and (3) implement a comprehensive internal compliance program.122 A
compliance monitor approved by the World Bank observes the compliance program for
three years andl 23 reports annually to the World Bank.124
A VDP participant conducts an internal investigation of all its contracts related to the
World Bank that were signed-or in effect-in the five years before entering the VDP.125
The participant reports the results of its investigation to the World Bank, and the World
Bank verifies the completeness and accuracy of that investigation. The World Bank then
shares selected disclosures with member countries, World Bank management and staff,
and other stakeholders through reports carefully redacted to keep the VDP participant's
identity confidential.
Participants in the VDP program pay most, if not all, of the costs associated with the
VDP process.126 In most situations the costs can be expected to be substantial because
there are significant expenses associated with conducting an internal investigation, design-
ing and implementing necessary compliance programs or taking other remedial measures,
and engaging a compliance monitor.
D. MEMBER GOVERNMENTS AND GOVERNMENT OmcIALs
Member governments and government officials are not sanctioned by the World
Bank.127 If the fraud or corruption involved "takes place within a government," efforts are
made by the World Bank to address the problem with the government.128 If resolution is
not possible through those efforts, the World Bank can take action "under its legal agree-
ment with the country." 29 Depending on the circumstances, disbursement of a loan may
120. Id. 1 5.3.1.
121. Id. 915.8.1.
122. Id. 1 3.
123. Id. 1 5.6.2.
124. Id.
125. Id. 11 5.5.1, 5.5.6.
126. Id. 91 7.1.1 (making an exception available under 9 7.1.2 for entities with fewer than fifty employees for
some of the costs to be borne by the INT).
127. Anti-Corruption Guidelines, supra note 22, at 14.
128. Id.
129. Id.
VOL. 44, NO. 2
ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES 883
be suspended or undisbursed loan amounts cancelled.3 0 Even early "repayment of the
loan" may be required.13'
II. Regional Development Banks
Regional development banks have, in large part, followed the World Bank's anti-cor-
ruption practices,132 policies, and procedures addressing corrupt and fraudulent prac-
tices.133 Thus, their policies and procedures are largely modeled on the World Bank.134
Indeed, language consistent with the World Bank's language, relative to fraud and corrupt
practices, was added to their procurement guidelines. 35 Hotlines and other means of
reporting violations have also been implemented.136
130. Id. (showing these circumstances may include when a determination is made by the World Bank that
fraud or corruption has occurred in connection with the loan proceeds, and the borrower, which can be a
member country, fails to take timely and appropriate action; that the borrower, which is not a member
country, has been sanctioned under another project; or when the borrower or another recipient of loan
proceeds failed to abide by the Anti-Corruption Guidelines).
13 1. Id.
132. See Williams, supra note 21, at 278-79 (making one major distinction between the World Bank and the
regional development banks is the absence of a well-established equivalent of the World Bank's VDP).
133. Asian Development Bank [ADBI, Anticorruption and Integrity, Frequently Asked Questions, http://
www.adb.org/Integrity/faqs.asp#q10 (last visited Apr. 1, 2010) (reflecting the primary exception-ADB's ef-
forts largely preceded those of the World Bank).
134. The sanctions procedures associated with the ADB, EBRD, and IADB are, respectively: ADB, Integrity
Principles and Guidelines (Nov. 2006), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Guidelines/Integrity-Prin-
ciples-Guidelines/default.asp?p=antipubs; EBRD, Enforcement Policy & Procedures (Mar. 27, 2009), available at
http://www.ebrd.com/about/integrity/epp.pdf; IADB, Sanctions Procedures, http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/
getdocument.aspx?docnum=841305. The AFDB does not appear to have published procedures associated
with its sanctions process. Some notable differences exist among the procedures of each institution. For
example, the ADB does not publicly disclose the identity of individuals or entities sanctioned under its proce-
dures. ADB, Confidentiality ofAnticorruption Sanctions List, http://www.adb.org/Anticorruption/issues.asp (last
visited Apr. 1, 2010). However, the ADB does disclose the identity of individuals or entities that attempted to
participate in ADB-financed activity while ineligible. ADB, Anticorruption and Integrity: Sanction, http://
www.adb.org/Integrity/sanctions.asp#attempt (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
135. African Development Bank Group [ADBG], Rules and Procedures for Procurement of Goods and Works, I
1.14 (May 2008), available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-related-
Procurement/Revised%20RULES%20AND%20PROCEDURES%20FOR%20PROCUREMENT%200F
%20GOODS%20&%20WORKS%20FINAL%20SEPTEMBER%202009%20ENGLISH.pdf; ADBG,
Rules and Procedures for the Use of Consultants, 1 1.22 (May 2008), available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/
uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-related-Procurement/Revised%20PROCEDURES%20FOR%20THE%2
OUSE%200F%20CONSULTANTS%20FINAL%20ENGLISH%20SEPTEMBER%202009.pdf; ADB,
Procurement Guidelines, 1.14 (Feb. 2007), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Guidelines/
Procurement/Guidelines-Procurement.pdf#page=14; ADB, Guidelines on the Use of Consultants by ADB and Its
Borrowers, 1 1.23 (Feb. 2007), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Guidelines/Consulting/
Guidelines-Consultants.pdf#page=17; EBRD, Procurement Policies and Rules, at 25, 1 2.9 (amended May
2007), available at http://www.ebrd.com/about/policies/procure/ppr.pdf; IADB, Policies for the Procurement of
Goods and Works Financed by the Inter-American Development Bank, 1 1.14 (July 2006), available at http://
idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=774392; IADB, Policies for the Selection and Contracting of
Consultants Financed by the Inter-American Development Bank, 1 1.21 (July 2006), available at http://idbdocs.
iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=774394.
136. The procedures for reporting fraud and corruption at the AFDB, ADB, EBRD, and IADB are, respec-
tively: AFDB, Reporting Fraud and Corruption, http://www.afdb.org/en/about-us/structure/auditor-gener-
als-office-oagilintegrity-and-anti-cornption/reporting-fraud-and-corruption/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2010);
ADB, How does ADB protect whistleblowers?, http://www.adb.org/Integrity/faqs.asp#q2 (last visited Apr. 21,
SUMMER 2010
884 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
In 2006, the leaders of the AFDB, ADB, EBRD, IADB, World Bank, European Invest-
ment Bank Group (EIB), and International Monetary Fund (IMF) established a task force
to work toward a consistent and coordinated approach to corruption associated with the
activities and operations of their institutions. 137 Adopting standardized definitions of
sanctionable conduct developed by the World Bank was among the first steps.138 The
leaders also agreed to develop common principles and guidelines for investigations.139
In addition to encouraging member institutions to exchange relevant information,140
efforts are being undertaken to determine how enforcement actions taken by one institu-
tion can be given greater support by the other institutions.' 4' Participants in a project
financed by member institutions are required to disclose any sanction imposed on them.142
Investment decisions must include enhanced efforts to identify beneficial ownership,
criminal history, investigations or sanctions by regulatory bodies, and civil litigation in-
volving allegations of financial misconduct.143
Recently, the multilateral development banks, as well as the EIB and IMF, agreed to the
implementation of a cross-debarment regime among the multilateral development
banks.144 In principle, debarment at one of the participating multilateral development
banks will now automatically extend to the other participating multilateral development
banks. The implications of sanctions imposed by one of the multilateral development
banks are thereby dramatically enhanced.
m. Conclusion
The reach of the anti-corruption policies of the multilateral lending institutions cannot
be overstated. Even entities that neither seek nor anticipate pursuing opportunities
through the multilateral lending institutions may be affected. Failure to bring their busi-
ness practices into compliance with these policies may bear on an individual's or entity's
ability to secure business opportunities through others, whether as a subcontractor or in
another capacity.145
2010); EBRD, Reporting Fraud and Corruption, http://www.ebrd.com/aboutlintegrity/compl/about.htm
(last visited Apr. 21, 2010); IADB, Integrity at the IDB Group, http-J/www.iadb.org/integrity/contact.cfn
(last visited Apr. 21, 2010).
137. Int'l Financial Institutions Anti-Corruption Task Force, Unform Framework for Preventing and Combat-
ing Fraud and Corruption, at I (Sept. 2006), available at http://siteresources.worldbankorg/INTDOII/Re-
sources/FinallFITaskForceFramework&Gdlines.pdf.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2-3.
143. Id. at 2.
144. Press Release, World Bank, Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) Step Up Their Fight Against
Corruption with Joint Sanction Accord, No. 2010/341/INT (Apr. 9,2010), availableat http://web.worldbank.
org/WBSITE/EXTERNAIJNEWS/,,contentMDK22535258-menuPK34463-pagePKL34370-piPK.3442
4-theSitePKL4607,00.htnl.
145. These policies are essentially the same as the policies being implemented by private entities throughout
the world as a result of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 and the various anti-bribery conventions.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 to -3, 78 ff (2010).
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The absence of an effective compliance program can also adversely impact more tradi-
tional settings where, as a matter of practice, individuals and entities may only work with
entities that have instituted effective compliance programs. A compliance program re-
cently implemented to qualify for a business opportunity will seldom be deemed to be as
credible as a compliance program that has been implemented and actively enforced over a
period of time. As a result, whether in line with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act or
anti-bribery legislation implemented by other countries, an effective compliance program
has the added benefit of enhancing an entity's ability to secure, either directly or indi-
rectly, opportunities with multilateral lending institutions.14 6
146. As an example, on July 2, 2009, the World Bank Group announced "a comprehensive settlement with
Siemens AG in the wake of the company's acknowledged past misconduct in its global business and a World
Bank investigation into corruption in a project in Russia involving a Siemens subsidiary." Press Release,
World Bank Group, Siemens to Pay $100m to Fight Corruption as Part of World Bank Group Settlement,
2009/001/EXT Guly 2, 2009), available at http://go.worldbank.org/WXRNSDVI40. The settlement in-
cluded a conmitment by Siemens to pay $100 million over fifteen years to support anti-corruption work, an
agreement of up to a four-year debarment for Siemens' Russian subsidiary, and a voluntary loss of the right to
bid on World Bank-financed projects for a two-year period. All of Siemens' consolidated subsidiaries and
affiliates were subject to the debarment.
The resolution with the World Bank followed a series of international investigations and legal proceedings
related to fraud or corruption in Siemens' operations. Id. In December 2008, Siemens settled related allega-
tions made by U.S. and German authorities. The allegations addressed by the World Bank Group were
fundamentally the same as those being investigated by U.S., German, and other enforcement officials. If
Siemens had held an effective anti-bribery compliance program, many if not most of the underlying reasons
for the investigations would never have arisen.
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